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Introduction
The analysis of the ideology of political parties and voters are important topics 
for political scientists (Germann et al. 2012). The ideological space occupied by political 
parties is analyzed by researchers with the help of candidates, politicians (Kitschelt et 
al. 1999, Hix and Crombez 2005) or experts (Benoit and Laver 2006). Others use the 
programs of political parties (Budge et al. 2001). Party mappings on the left and right 
dimensions improve the chances for citizens to cast a correct vote. They provide a 
heuristic device that assist citizens in expressing preferences on issues (Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1989, Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). There is little research (Germann 
et al. 2012, Marian and King  2014) that surveys the ideological preferences of the party 
in the electorate (Key 1964) or that compares the ideological preferences of citizens 
to the ideological positions of political parties (Huber and Powell 1994). This article 
explores the potential of a new method of gathering data that can be used to explore 
the political preferences of citizens. VAA (Voting Advice Applications) data allows 
the comparison of the ideological positions of citizens with the positions of political 
parties. It is also a tool that helps voters to make informed choices (Alvarez et al. 2014, 
Ruusuvirta and Rosema 2009, Wall et al. 2014). VAAs have become popular in many 
European countries (Garzia and Marschall 2012). The application asks users to express 
preferences on 30 issues that are considered important for the upcoming elections. After 
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ABSTRACT
What are the main dimensions of  competition between political parties 
in Romania? Is there a match of  the electorate policy preferences with those 
of  political parties? This paper analyzes what are the main dimensions of  
competition between parties in Romania by looking at the issue preferences of  the 
party in the electorate. We use data obtained from the voting advice application 
(VAA) applied in 2012 (votulmeu.com) in Romania. Finally we compare our 
results with Chapel Hill expert party mappings and claim that VAA data are 
a reliable source for finding out the programmatic peferences of  party supporters. 
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completing the survey, the online tool ranks the political parties running in elections 
according to their compatibility with the users preferences. The advantages of VAAs 
for party mapping are that it is a cost efficient tool of data gathering, it secures more 
anonimity to respondents than traditional or telephone surveys and includes a higher 
number of issues than regular surveys (Garzia et al. 2014). The main disadvantage is 
that users are self selected. This article explores the usefulness of VAA in Romania. It 
claims that despite the problems that arise from self selection, the application generates 
party mappings that are comparable with other methods of assessing the ideological 
space of political parties.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly account for the studies that use 
VAA for party mapping and political behavior. Secondly, we present the approaches 
used in party mappings in general with a focus on studies that used VAAs, followed 
by a discussion on party mappings in Romania. Next we describe the Romanian VAA 
and the methodology, followed by a presentation of the results and a discussion on the 
implications of the findings. This paper will use the VAA (Voting Advice Application) 
data collected from the application „votulmeu.com” to build party maps based on the 
preferences of citizens and political parties.
VAA Studies
The rationale of a voting advice application is to provide an online tool that 
helps citizens in making an informed vote choice at elections. The application matches 
the users’ preferences to the stances of political parties. VAAs is now widely used in 
Europe (Germann et al. 2012).  The popularity of this application is motivated by the 
increasing number of floating voters that need guidance during the electoral campaign 
(Mair 2008). Researchers use these data to test hypotheses regarding the quality of 
advice it gives (Alvarez et al. 2014) and the biases it encompasses (Gemenis 2013), as a 
determinant of vote choice (Andreadis et al. 2013)  or as a measurement of congruence 
between citizens and candidates or political parties (Fivaz et al. 2014). 
The number of citizens that respond to voting advice applications varies 
substantially. For example in the Netherlands in the 2006 elections there were 4,6 
million users, in Germany in 2009 there were 6,7 million (12% of the electorate), 
Belgium (13% of the electorate), and Switzerland (more than 20% of the electorate) 
had 1 million users each (Garzia 2010, Walgrave et al. 2008). In the Czech Republic 
at the first direct presidential elections organized in 2013, over 1 million users used 
KohoVolit.eu the Czech VAA. With the exception of the Czech Republic, in several 
other Eastern European countries VAAs are not very popular. In the 2009 European 
Elections in Poland there were 31389 users, in Lithuania 1836 and in Latvia 974. In 
Romania in 2009 there were 1678 respondents VAA, Bulgaria 6319 and Hungary 
6622 (Trechsel 2010). The Romanian 2012 VAA used in this paper had 16107 users, 
representing 0, 08% of the electorate. Compared to the Romanian European elections 
VAA from 2009 (1678 users) (Trechsel 2010) the number of respondents increased 
substantially. 
The research that uses VAAs targets its design, validity and its effects on vote 
choice and political representation (Marschall and Garzia 2014, Triga et al. 2012). 
Studies that inquire about the quality of the match given by VAAs (Lefevere and 
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Walgrave 2012) warn about the potential of the application to give the wrong advices 
because of the way the statements are phrased. Researchers focus on the effect of 
statement selection (Baka et al. 2012, Gemenis 2013) and they issue warnings about 
the distortions and the manipulative potential of the application (Nuytemans et al. 
2010). Secondly there are studies that measure the impact of VAA’s on the party 
choice (Marschall and Garzia 2014, Triga et al. 2012). VAAs can be considered as an 
additional tool of the electoral campaign that helps voters to make informed choices. 
That is why it could be considered as an instrument of political influence (Çarkoğlu 
et al. 2012, Wall et al. 2014). There is an abundant literature on the effects of political 
campaigning on political preferences. Hansen (2011) identifies six stories explaining 
the impact of electoral campaigns. First citizens can learn from campaigns what are 
their duties and choices (civic learning model) (Freedman et al. 2004 and Moore, 1987), 
secondly citizens have predispositions that are simply reinforced through campaigns 
(minimal effects model) (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954, Schmitt-Beck 2007: 
753), thirdly political campaigns can set the issues according to which citizens judge 
candidates (priming studies) (Iyengar and Simon, 1993) and influence party choice, 
fourthly citizens acquire and digest information obtained from political campaigns and 
make decisions according to the type of information they remember (memory based 
models) (Althaus 2003, Zaller, 1992). The fifth model sees voters as continuously 
ingesting information (Lodge et al. 1995) from political discourses and adjusting or 
reinforcing their preferences. And finally, we have the model of heuristics (Iyengar, 
1990, Lau and Redlawsk, 2001, Sniderman et al. 1991) that considers voters as investing 
minimal efforts to obtain good quality or enough information to make a choice between 
candidates. Studies that use VAA embraced the models of campaign influence on vote 
choice (Fivaz and Nadig 2012, Marschall and Schultze 2012, Pianzola and Ladner 
2011, Ruusuvirta and Rosema 2009). Some compared vote switching of VAA users 
to non-users. The results showed that VAA users are more likely to resort to vote 
switching (Andreadis, Pianzola et al. 2013) than non-VAA users. This finding confirms 
the civic learning model in which the VAA is viewed as a political learning device. Wall 
et al. (2011) used an experimental design to present the Dutch VAA as more of a tool 
for reinforcing pre-existing preferences of citizens.  They found confirmation of the 
minimal effects model of VAA influence on vote in electoral campaigns. 
Some accentuate the use of VAA as an alternative for measuring congruence 
(Alvarez et al. 2014) or mapping the preferences of the party in the electorate (Garzia 
and Marschall  2012, Gemenis 2013).  The mapping of political parties could replace 
expert surveys or party manifesto party mappings (Mendez and Wheatley 2014). VAAs 
are easy to organize, the number of respondents is high and in many countries the data 
obtained is representative (Mendez and Wheatley 2014). Research that includes VAA 
party mappings focus on accuracy and the match with party mappings from manifesto 
data or surveys (Gemenis 2014, Mendez and Wheatley 2014, Wheatley et al. 2014). The 
results indicated that VAAs can be used especially in countries in which the number 
of users is high and approximating the population’s socio demographic characteristics 
(Gemenis 2013, Mendez and Wheatley 2014). Although VAAs may accurately measure 
party positions, these cannot take into account valence issues and can be manipulated 
by candidates who might choose to have positions close to as many voters as possible 
in order to get a higher score (Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2010). VAA respondents 
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are unlike the national population. They are well educated, young and interested in 
politics. Where possible, the problem of representativeness was partially solved by 
giving weight to under-represented groups (Wheatley et al. 2014). 
Wheatley et al. (2014) mapped political parties in Scotland with results from an 
experiment in which they compared the party supporters’ preferences on VAA with 
a face to face survey. They discovered remarkable similarities between the political 
preferences of online users and the surveyed population. Germann et al. (2012) build 
party mappings with the Smartvote VAA application for the Swiss parliamentary 
elections of 2007, and found comparable results with mappings from survey data. 
Our paper belongs to this stream of studies. We explore and identify the patterns 
yielding from the political preferences expressed by users of the Votulmeu (My Vote) 
in Romania and compare our results with expert surveys. 
Ideological space and party mappings
Researchers map parties most often according to expert surveys, interviews 
with representatives or party activists (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Grecu 2003, Markowski 
and Tucker 2010) and party manifestoes (Benoit and Laver 2006, Budge et al. 2001, 
Klingemann et al. 2006, Laver 2001). The VAA presents certain advantages compared 
to them: they are cost effective, the number of respondents is high and they offer a 
platform that allows the comparison of preferences of citizens with parties. On the 
other hand respondents are self-selected and candidates can manipulate their position 
so that the VAA will advise users to vote for the candidates’ own party (Germann et 
al. 2012).
For Romania, and for most of post-communist new democracies in Eastern 
Europe, Herbert Kitschelt (1992) identifies two issue dimensions on which most 
parties compete. One source of competition between political parties is viewed as 
originating from the allocation of material resources in society. On the one hand there 
are political parties that support the unstructured allocation while other parties will 
support a redistributive system. Secondly the competition among parties stems from 
the way rights should be distributed in society. One camp supports a universal, equal 
opportunities view of how these rights should be allocated. The other camp agrees 
that certain groups should enjoy more rights than others. Others topics identified 
by Kitschelt (1992) were regime divide or the communist/anticommunist divide, 
national-cosmopolitan and ethnic divide. Evans and Whitefield (1993) and Whitefield 
(2002) confirm Kitschelts’ findings. Whitefield (2002) claims that despite the diversity 
of cleavages, the dimensions of competition in Eastern Europe turned out to be not 
very different from the Western European political systems. The importance of ethnic 
diversity (attitudes toward Hungarians or Russians) remains one specific dimension 
of competition in some countries from Eastern Europe (Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, or 
Romania). Kitschelt (1992) uses mass surveys and expert placement of parties when 
building the party mappings for The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania. For Romania he maps parties on the distributive versus 
spontaneous market allocation axis and the authoritarian versus libertarian axis. Grecu 
(2003), who uses expert survey data from 2002 presents similar findings to discover, 
in Romania, an economic dimension and a pro versus anti attitude towards minorities. 
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Later studies confirm the existence of two dimensions of competition among 
parties in Romania (Benoit and Laver 2006). Fesnic (2008) builds party mappings 
using preferences of the Romanian electorate from 1993 until 2006 and identifies a 
dimension labelled left-right referring to what Hooghe et al. (2010) called economic 
left right. The second dimension identified is labeled by Fesnic New Politics referring 
to the authoritarian/libertarian preferences.
European integration is an issue that gains relevance in Eastern Europe starting 
with the negotiations to join the European Union. The Chapel Hill expert surveys of 
2006 and 2010 focus on this topic, revealing parties as having differentiated positions 
in Eastern Europe (Hooghe et al. 2010 and Bakker et al. 2012). In Poland the choice 
for a Eurosceptic party in 2002 predicted an anti EU attitude in the referendum, 
overshadowing socio-demographic determinants. The result is surprising for a political 
system characterized by low party loyalties (Markowski and Tucker, 2010). Considering 
these findings we hypothesize that with the help of the 2012 Romanian VAA data we will identify 
dimensions of competition similar to other party mappings for Romania. The economic left right 
dimension, GAL-TAN and attitudes toward EU are the issues on which Romanian parties would 
be differentiated. 
Methodology
”Votul meu” is the VAA that went online one month before the Romanian 
parliamentary elections that took place on December 9, 2012. The users had to express 
their preferences on thirty statements that were considered to be the most important 
for that particular electoral campaign. The possible answers were: “Completely Agree”, 
“Agree”, “Neither Agree nor Disagree”, “Disagree” and “Completely Disagree”. 
One extra option presented to respondents was “Don’t Know”. The positions of the 
political parties in Romania were coded on the same 30 statements by country experts. 
The application matched the responses of each applicant with the score obtained by 
the party through the expert coding. Pre-electoral surveys predicted that four relevant 
parties and coalitions would enter the parliament. These were The Social Democratic 
Party (PSD-Partidul Social Democrat) and The National Liberal Party (PNL- Partidul 
Naţional Liberal) united in a coalition called The Social Liberal Union. They were 
joined by two smaller parliamentary parties such as the Conservative Party (PC-Partidul 
Conservator) and The National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR-Uniunea 
Nationala pentru Progresul României). Both parties had less than 2% of electoral 
support yet they had parliamentary representation in the 2008-2012 legislature and 
gained seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The Democratic Liberal Party (PDL 
- Partidul Democrat Liberal) was also part of an electoral coalition named The Right 
Romania Alliance (ARD- Alianta Romania Dreapta) that included the Civic Force 
(FC - Forta Civica) and the National Peasant Party who’s few representatives gained 
parliamentary representation. The People’s Party Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD- Partidul 
Poporului Dan Diaconescu) surprisingly won 47 seats (Romanian Electoral Office 
2012) in the lower chamber of representatives with a populist electoral message 
(Gherghina and Miscoiu 2014). Finally. the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (UDMR- Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România) gained 18 seats in the 
lower chamber of representatives (Romanian Electoral Office 2012). 
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In addition to the preferences on policies users were asked questions on party 
identification, voting behavior and left and right. ”Votul Meu” contained 18484 
respondents. Not all of them completed all the questions in the survey or had valid 
answers. After applying various filtering procedure 16107 respondents’ answers were 
kept.
Figure 1. Positions of political parties according to expert surveys used in the VAA Votulmeu at the 2012 
parliamentary elections. These positions are matched with the users preferences.
Gemenis (2013) identifies a deductive and inductive method of finding issue 
dimensions. A deductive method refers to the selection of issues to be introduced 
in the factor analysis that match pre-determined dimensions, while the latter method 
is employed to find dimensionality in all issues on which users express preferences. 
We find the inductive method more convincing as our purpose is to explore the 
preferences of the VAA online users and find dimensionality in all their responses. For 
the inductive method the identification of dimensions is done by factor analysis with 
Varimax rotation. To identify the groupings of statements that qualified for theoretical 
constructs, we selected factors with Cronbach alpha higher than 0.7.  As a further test 
we made use of Mokken scaling to test the validity of our constructs (Wheatley et al. 
2014).
In order to identify the positions of parties on the ideological maps we have 
selected the respondents that felt close to a party and they intend to vote for that party. 
Thus we followed the selection method used by Wheatley et al. (2014) and Germann 
et al. (2012). These restrictions reduced the number of respondents to 6259.  Next we 
compared the Chapel Hill expert surveys of 2010 and 2006 to our party mappings. 
These surveys contain identical questions with the 2012 Romanian VAA for the 
GAL-TAN and economic dimensions although the coding method was different. We 
recoded the VAA data to match the Chapel Hill coding. 
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Data analysis and results
In 2012, Romania registered the lowest Internet penetration in the European 
Union. Therefore it is no surprise that the data generated by Votul Meu suffered to 
a greater extent from representation concerns as other VAAs. 78% of the Romanian 
VAA respondents have graduate studies, and 78% come from urban areas. A 2012 
face to face survey showed that 13% of the population has graduate studies and half 
of the population of Romania lives in rural areas. The population that was surveyed 
differs in terms of political preferences as well. The majority prefers center right wing 
parties. Moreover according to the VAA users the center right wing parties would win 
the parliamentary election. Thus our data is not nationally representative. It is more 
likely to be representing the urban and citizens with more years of education. On the 
other hand Zaller (1992) and later Althaus (2003) showed that the better off category 
of population might also be the most influential voice on representatives. Secondly 
this group is ideal to survey because the chances to discover patterns of ideological 
thinking are increased. 
Before engaging into the analysis of preferences we follow Converse’s (1964) 
warnings regarding the pursuit of patterns of ideological thinking. When discussing 
about people having belief systems we have to take into account the number of non-
responses. Converse (1964) noted that the number of “no opinion” in surveys is quite 
high leaving the expression of preferences to a few citizens. In the Romanian VAA the 
number of non-responses on issues is low. It ranges from 0.6% (89) to 7.5% (1190). 
Party supporters represent 38% (6177) of the respondents in our survey. The level 
non response of party supporters ranged from 0.5% (31) to 4.6% (282). Next, in order 
to map the preferences of the party in the electorate (Key, 1964) we used exploratory 
factor analysis (Table 1).
Table 1. Factor analysis of 30 statements on important Romanian issues.
Nr.
Issue Austerity measures/European integration GAL-TAN Left-right
1 The state should intervene to lower the price of basic foods. -.302 -.119 .684
2 The Romanian state should allow the 
Canadian company Gabriel Resources to 
continue operations at Rosia Montana.
,608 ,123 -.179
3 The poorest citizens should pay less 
income tax. -,214 -,011 .680
4 Pension funds should be nationalized to fill 
shortages in the state pension fund. -,128 ,039 .645
5 External loans from institutions such as the 
IMF are a good solution to crisis situations. ,662 ,063 -.091
6 Foreign private investors' access to natural 
resources contracts in Romania should be 
banned. 
-,331 -,131 .437
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7 It is acceptable for the government to cut 
salaries in the public sector during the crisis 
to keep the budget deficit at a low level. ,619 ,043 -.297
8 Parliament should remain bicameral. -,586 ,033 .048
9 Romania should become a parliamentary 
republic. -,578 ,112 .084
10 All proven collaborators of the Securitate 
should be denied access to public 
functions.
,158 -,050 -.085
11 Ethnically-based parties should be banned. -,080 -,398 -.094
12 Romania should restore the monarchy. -,256 ,122 -.069
13 The Bucharest authorities have too much 
power to decide on matters in the rest of  
the country.
,064 ,244 .000
14 Romania should cede more decision-
making power to the EU. ,615 ,224 -.230
15 Romania should improve its relationship 
with Russia. -,213 -,062 .070
16 Romania should pursue reunification with 
Moldova ,272 -,280 .147
17 International partners (such as the U.S. 
or EU) have the right to interfere in the 
internal affairs of Romania when they feel 
there is a threat to democracy.
,714 ,154 -.082
18 Homosexuals should have the right to 
express themselves freely in public. ,113 ,161 -.073
19 The church has too much influence in 
Romanian society. -,004 ,042 -.032
20 The death penalty should be reintroduced 
for heinous crimes. ,045 -,160 .218
21 The law should give priority to employees 
against their employers. -,113 -,054 .692
22 Women should have the right to decide 
whether to remain pregnant. ,058 -,058 .000
23 Between kindergarden and first grade, 
children should go to a preparatory class 
at school.
,576 ,080 -.027
24 Small rural hospitals should be closed, and 
the state should invest in larger regional 
hospitals.
,594 ,100 -.267
25 Hungarian politicians should cooperate 
more with the authorities in Budapest 
than those from Bucharest to meet the 
objectives of the Hungarian minority in 
Romania.
,121 ,604 .074
The Romanian Journal of  Society and Politics126
26 All Hungarians should be obliged to learn 
Romanian. -,064 -,583 ,262
27 A territorial reform should include the 
creation of an autonomous Hungarian 
region. 
,073 ,784 -,012
28 Cultural autonomy for minorities would 
constitute a threat to Romania. -,158 -,466 ,294
29 Minorities should have the right to 
education exclusively in the mother tongue, 
including at university. 
,137 ,702 -.035
30 The Roma ethnic population of cities 
should live isolated from the rest of the 
community.
-,005 -,012 .062
The analysis yields eight dimensions that had an Eigen values larger than a unity. 
We selected the issues with the loading coefficients higher than 0,6 and identified 
three dimensions with Cronbach alpha 0,781, 0,616 and 0.712 showing robust internal 
consistency.. The three dimensions are labeled in Table 1. In order to provide an 
additional test of the robustness of our findings we use Mokken scaling. Mokken 
scaling shows whether the identified dimensions have components that are scalable. 
The indicator of scalability H shows that the scale has moderate strength (between .3 
and .5 - see Table 2).
Table 2  Mokken scales with scalability coefficient (Hi) on issues that load as important on the factor 
analysis 
Item Question Scales
European 
integration 
(0.449)
GAL-TAN 
(0.403)
Left-
Right 
(0.423)
1 The state should intervene to lower the price of basic foods. 0.458
2
The Romanian state should allow the Canadian 
company Gabriel Resources to continue operations at 
Rosia Montana.
0.396
3 The poorest citizens should pay less income tax. 0.418
4 Pension funds should be nationalized to fill shortages in the state pension fund. 0.416
5 External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a good solution to crisis situations. 0.438
7
It is acceptable for the government to cut salaries in the 
public sector during the crisis to keep the budget deficit 
at a low level.
0.437
14 Romania should cede more decision-making power to the EU. 0.476
17
International partners (such as the U.S. or EU) have the 
right to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania when 
they feel there is a threat to democracy.
0.495
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21 The law should give priority to employees against their employers. 0.394
25
Hungarian politicians should cooperate more with 
the authorities in Budapest than those from Bucharest 
to meet the objectives of the Hungarian minority in 
Romania.
0.313
27 A territorial reform should include the creation of an autonomous Hungarian region. 0.464
29
Minorities should have the right to education 
exclusively in the mother tongue, including at 
university.
0.426
The first dimension loaded on a mixture of economic policies and preferences 
on the influence of IMF and EU. It includes environmental concerns, public fund 
cuts, surrendering decision-making to EU and accepting IMF and EU as protectors of 
democracy.  This is a dimension that reflects the main electoral campaign topics. On 
the 6th of July 2012, president Basescu was suspended by the Parliament. A referendum 
was organized in order to support this decision. The referendum failed to reach the 
50% turnout required for the validation. The EU, IMF and Venice Commission 
issued several warnings to Prime Minister Victor Ponta and interim president Crin 
Antonescu not to influence the results of the referendum and respect the decisions 
of the Constitutional Courts. The other source for this dimension is the role IMF had 
on the austerity measures imposed by the government of Prime Minister Emil Boc. 
The most radical measure was the 25% wage cuts of each public sector employee. We 
would call this the European integration and austerity measures dimension. We suspect 
that it is a transient topic that is connected to the context of the 2012 referendum for 
the dismissal of the president, the economic crisis and the tense relationship with IMF 
and EU.
The second dimension covers preferences on issues referring to the Hungarian 
community, the cultural autonomy for all minorities and education in mother tongue. 
This issue is similar to the libertarian-cosmopolitan politics versus authoritarian 
particularist politics dimension identified by Kitschelts’(1992) party mappings. 
Following Marks et al. (2006) and Wheatley et al. (2014) we call this dimension Green- 
Alternative –Libertarian / Traditional-Authoritarian Nationalist GAL/TAN. 
The third dimension includes preferences that refer to issues similar to the 
economic left-right dimension. States intervention to lower the price of basic foods, 
protection of the public pensions system and states protection of employees are topics 
that divide citizens on the economic left-right scale. We consider that the last two 
dimensions are more stable and explain party positions and shifts over time. Next, we 
mapped parties by calculating the average score a group of party supporters receives 
on the three dimensions and mapped the scores on pairs of dimensions.
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Figure 2. Party mappings on three dimensions: European integration, GAL-TAN, economic left-right (Positions 
represent the average position of party supporters recoded so that variation will range from 0 to 1.)
European integration -0 means opposition to European integration
GAL-TAN – GAL means green, alternative, liberal and TAN means traditional, authoritarian, nationalist
Left-Right – left is a preference for state intervention in the market and support for social services and right 
symbolizes a minimal state and privatization of social services
The results show that the four groups of supporters of parliamentary parties 
have distinct positions on the identified dimensions. Relative to other parties, the PSD 
supporters have center-left preferences on the economic left-right dimension. The 
party that is the most to the left is the populist PP-DD. PNL is considered a liberal 
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pro-market party (Fesnic, 2008). The party mappings show, however, that supporters 
are left wing, against the influence of IMF and EU and foreign investors. On left-
right axis, this party’s position is center-left confirming the party’s ideological shift. 
The liberal party joined a coalition with the social-democrats in 2011 and formed the 
government together with PSD in 2012. Previous party mappings placed this party as 
the most right wing as a pro-market and libertarian party (Grecu, 2003, Fesnic, 2008).
PDL is the party that is a former splinter from PDSR (PDSR - The Party of 
Social Democracy from Romania). The party was in government from 2008 until May 
2012 when the Ungureanu government received a vote of no confidence. PDL had 
to implement harsh economic reforms following EU and IMF recommendations. 
These included a 25% cut in public sector wages and the cancellation of all monetary 
premiums. Its government initiated several controversial reforms in education, health 
and public administration. The party mappings show this party as center-right on the 
economic left-right axis and the strongest supporter of IMF and EU intervention in 
the economy or country’s decision making process. This is not a surprise. Earlier in 
2012, the dismissal of the president, supported by PDL, raised serious concerns about 
the democratic consolidation and the separation of powers in the country. EU officials, 
the Venice Commission and the US Ambassador criticized the USL government for 
pressuring the Constitutional Court to issue a decision through which the dismissal 
of the president would be permanent. These reactions generated criticisms from USL 
leaders who accused The European Union and The United States of interfering with 
Romanian national decision making. This was an unprecedented type of discourse 
coming from a country in which citizens and parties showed solid support for the EU 
and the United States. PDL encouraged its supporters not to turn out at the referendum. 
UDMR supporters are centrist on European integration and the economic left-right 
axes. The party is set apart from the other parties on GAL-TAN. UDMR is the party 
that represents the ethnic Hungarians. Its main goal is to ensure the representation 
of its minority thus it is the most open to rights accorded to the Hungarian minority. 
Given its focus on Hungarian minority rights, UDMR was able to be in alliance with 
both left and right wing parties from 1996 until 2012. 
PNL, PSD and PPDD have similar positions on the austerity measures and the 
interference of EU and IMF in national decision making. These parties were especially 
vocal against the declarations of Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, and other 
officials that criticized Romanian officials with tampering with the independence of 
the Constitutional Court during the dismissal of Traian Basescu. The PDL electorate 
supports the austerity measures and the pro-market policies. PDL’s economic policies 
in 2011 and 2012 included austerity measures such as wage and benefit cuts, taxation 
of pensions higher than 250 euro and increased VAT tax from 19% to 24%. It seems 
that a part of the Romanian electorate supports these measures.
Besides the 30 statements, the users were asked to place themselves on a GAL-
TAN and economic scales. We compared the positions of party supporters on the 
scales identified in the factor analysis with the answers on the GAL-TAN and the 
economic axes. It seems that supporters from all parties view themselves far more 
social liberal when they are asked to express a preference between being a social liberal 
or a conservative traditionalist regarding minority rights. On the economic left-right 
the most surprising position is that of PNL supporters. They view themselves as 
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supporters of market economy when asked to express a preference on the left-right 
axis but are at odds with the policy preferences they support (Fig. 2) and with the 
position of their party (Fig. 1). While the expert party mapping of PNL is closely 
matched by the mapping of policy preferences, the positioning of party supporters on 
the left-right axis does not reveal such a shift. Party supporters see themselves as right 
wing social liberals at odds with the policy preferences they support. One reason for 
such a mismatch might lie in the lacking capacity of citizens to use the economic left 
right and GAL-TAN (Marian and King 2014) axes as a proxy for identifying parties 
closed to them. Marian and King (2014) observed that since 1990 no more than 40% 
of citizens place themselves on the left-right scale, although data from 2012 shows that 
this percentage increased.
We do not have surveys from 2012 applied in Romania to test the external 
validity of our findings. However we use the Chapel Hill expert survey from 2010 and 
2006 to compare the positions of PSD, PNL, PDL and UDMR with our findings. The 
expert data of the Chapel Hill survey confirms the ideological positions of political 
parties and party supporters on the GAL-TAN and economic left-right.
Figure 3. The ideological positions of political parties in Romania. For VAA data positions represent the 
average position of party supporters recoded so that variation will range from 0 to 1, The Chapel Hill data 
represent average party positions according to country experts
  VAA 2012  preferences compiled from the aggregation of issue stances of party supporters
  VAA 2012 positions of parties on GAL-TAN and economic axes according to the expert survey
 Chapel Hill expert survey 2010   Chapel Hill expert survey 2006  GAL  means green alternative 
liberal and TAN- traditional, authoritarian, nationalist
The positions of political parties by experts are similar with the party supporters’ 
preferences on the economy and GAL-TAN axes. PDL and PNL are viewed as center 
right wing parties. On GAL-TAN, PNL and UDMR are the most liberal followed by 
PDL and PSD. PNL has a different position than in our party mappings but this is 
possibly due to its recent ideological shift towards the left. The obvious discrepancy 
lies in comparing the preferences of citizens based on issues on GAL-TAN. Although 
most party supporters view themselves as social liberal, in a similar vein to how experts 
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see parties, the party supporters’ preferences on specific issues that target acceptance 
of Hungarians reveal a far more conservative view. The party mappings in the expert 
surveys match closely the party supporters’ positions on the left right and GAL-TAN 
adding to the validity of our results. 
Conclusions
VAA applications provide a unique opportunity for social scientists to map, test 
and analyze the programmatic thinking of citizens. Despite its limitations, VAA data 
are easy to obtain, the issues cover several domains, and the number of respondents 
is high. In this paper VAA “Votulmeu.com” was used to test whether we can draw 
valid party mappings of party supporters’ preferences. The data obtained from the 
Romanian VAA is not representative of the whole population as it is confronted 
with problems of self-selection and it is biased towards citizens who use the internet, 
the highly educated living in urban areas. The biases are larger for Romania due to 
its low number of internet users (40% in 2012), the smallest figure in the European 
Union. There were above 16000 respondents that completed the survey. The number 
of respondents was small in comparison with other VAA’s applied in Europe but it 
was ten times larger than a VAA applied in Romania in 2009. The party mappings of 
preferences revealed that there were three important dimensions of competition. The 
first included a mixture of economic austerity measures and attitudes on foreign policy. 
This is a dimension that was particularly salient in 2011 and 2012. At the beginning 
of 2011, Basescu, announced the implementation of harsh austerity measures such as 
the raise of VAT from 19 to 24% and 25% wage cuts in the public sector. The IMF 
recommended some of these measures. Later, in 2012, the president was suspended 
by a majority vote in parliament. EU officials reacted to the attempts of the Ponta 
government to avoid constitutional rulings and dismiss the president. The mingling 
of international institutions affected the opinions of citizens. The second dimension 
identified was GAL-TAN with left wing parties being more conservative than the 
right wing ones. Thirdly the economic left-right dimension covered issues that have 
to do with providing protection for the pension system and protecting employees 
from employers. The mappings confirmed previous studies on the analysis of party 
programmatic competition in Romania. The validity of the results was tested by 
comparing the expert positioning of political parties in Romania by the Chapel Hill 
survey. While the preferences on the economic dimension were similar, on GAL-
TAN issues party supporters had more conservative preferences. At the same time, 
they viewed themselves as more social liberal. The expert surveys mappings and the 
mapping of party supporters’ preferences on the left-right and GAL-TAN, with the 
help of the VAA, showed remarkable similarity. To conclude, we find that VAA for 
Romania is a valid and cost effective resource for party mappings.
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